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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This work is concerned with nascent entrepreneurial teams and how their 
composition evolves during the early years. The aim is to find an underlying 
mechanism that explains the occurrence of team changes to a significant extent. A 
team change can happen in two ways: Adding or dropping a member. Although these 
two events might have entirely different motivations, both events can be affected by 
the same systematic when observing a large number of changes.  
It is assumed that in a population of young entrepreneurs individual Human Capital 
levels are fixed and teams are forming to create new ventures. Human Capital 
describes the quantity and quality of skills and abilities an individual has. Based on 
the theory by Fabel (2004), it has been shown that only individuals with relatively 
similar levels meet to form a team. When observing existing entrepreneurial teams, a 
structure of “Human Capital homogeneity” is apparent (Sonderegger, 2009).  
Starting from a snapshot of young existing teams which were already diagnosed to 
follow the Human Capital homogeneity principle, this work goes one step ahead and 
analyzes team changes in the years after the first observation. The hypothesis is that 
team entries and exits in the following period will also be guided by the mechanism of 
ability-matching, meaning that in the end homogeneity will be even higher than at the 
beginning. 
The first part gives a basic idea of early-stage entrepreneurship and explains why 
inputs in the form of Human, Financial and Social Capital are important. Literature 
combining these areas of research is summarized, heading to studies that are closely 
related to this work; it finishes with a detailed explanation of the theory which 
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introduced the idea of Human Capital homogeneity. The second part starts directly 
with the analysis, gives a detailed insight to the applied methodology and presents 
unexpected results. Human Capital homogeneity is not observed in the later stage; 
exits are rather driven by team size and a strong U-shaped relationship to social 
acquaintance. The findings are summarized in the conclusion, followed by an outlook 
for future research. 
The aim of this work is to give a small contribution for understanding entrepreneurial 
team evolution. This research area crosses the borderlines between sociology and 
economy. Besides focusing on the economic point of view, the work attempts not to 
neglect different explanations and approaches to the same complex topic. Once 
properly understood, the insights will be useful for perceiving entrepreneurial teams 
less as “black boxes” and more as important and logically interacting systems in the 
whole economic context; after all, business ventures are still gaining importance as 
the key driver for innovation and constantly revolutionize not only branches, but 
often society as a whole. 
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2. LITERATURE 
 
2.1. EARLY-STAGE ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
 
In innovation-driven economies of western countries, the creation of new businesses 
is a typical way to exploit opportunities that emerge primarily through the expansion 
of the service sector. The increasingly sophisticated needs of a wealthy society let 
established, efficient companies be challenged by risk-taking new ventures (Bosma & 
Levie, 2009). Successful young companies typically address the needs with creative 
products or services, and they are often rewarded with high returns and quick 
growth. A significant part of the risk they bear is resulting from their “liabilities of 
newness” (Stinchcombe, 1965), such as their lack of routine, the dependence upon 
strangers (especially within the founding team itself) and hostile market forces 
including strong competition or customer’s and supplier’s negotiation power. 
Ventures that have better access to viable resources or are able to hedge the risks 
efficiently tend to outperform the others, even if this just means staying alive instead 
of failure. Before resources are addressed in greater detail, a typical founding process 
is illustrated. 
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Illustration 1: Stages of Venture Evolution (Bosma & Levie, 2009) 
This work focuses on the phase between conception and firm birth, where firm 
founders are often referred to as nascent entrepreneurs. They may come from 
different social and educational spheres. The term also includes people who have had 
many years of branch experience or people who have already founded firms before. 
The insight of experienced founders often helps them to identify a very specific 
business opportunity which is best exploited by creating a new venture. Many start-
ups emerge as spin-offs from existing companies.  
During the phase of early-stage entrepreneurial activity, basic organizational- and 
resource structures are defined. This is of utmost importance for the future success 
and leaves an “organizational imprint” on the enterprise (Stinchcombe, 1965). Many 
businesses are founded by only one person as single ventures, but the focus of this 
work is on team foundations. At this stage, some of the issues owners regularly have 
to decide about are the following: Should the business idea be rather conventional or 
more innovative? Which market entry strategies are promising for the specific 
industry? What is the optimal capital structure? And how should the start-up team be 
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composed in terms of qualification? (Mellewigt & Witt, 2002) Scholars, consultants 
and other experts offer extensive advice for these questions, but right answers may 
be impossible to give in advance. 
It should be noted that the phases of the founding process are often not clearly 
differentiable. A team of nascent entrepreneurs completes many milestones and 
slowly transforms into a top management team while the venture matures and 
becomes a fully operational business. The definitions of “firm birth” vary in the 
literature, reaching from the time when the firm becomes an “independent 
commercial actor in the economy, affecting the prices and quantities of goods traded 
in the market” to the achievement of a “monthly cash flow covering all expenses and 
owner’s salaries” for several periods (Reynolds & Curtin, 2008). The rather easy-to-
determine second criterion being satisfied for 6 or more out of 12 months is used to 
separate relevant start-ups and already operational businesses in the underlying 
dataset of this work. 
 
2.2. SUCCESS FACTORS 
 
What are the factors that account for venture success? Many empirical studies deal 
with the vital resources young businesses strive for. The three main topics are 
Financial Capital, Human Capital and Social Capital, which also influence each other in 
different ways. Before empirical findings are presented, each type of capital is 
defined. 
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2.2.1. FINANCIAL CAPITAL 
 
Financial Capital is to be interpreted straightforwardly. It is monetary funding, 
provided either by the founders themselves or by external parties. Depending on the 
type of business, less restriction for investment in assets or more liquidity for 
covering expenses is clearly an advantage. A key role is played by venture capitalists 
(VC): They are institutions who provide capital for promising young businesses. 
Typically, they participate as equity holders themselves, becoming owners of the 
business with decision rights. This means in case of a failure, they have their whole 
investment at stake, which can make up to several hundred millions of dollars. For 
bearing this risk, they expect high returns when they sell their part of the business 
after a few years. Best selling prices are usually achieved via initial public offering 
(IPO), i.e. selling the equity at the stock exchange. The challenging task for a VCs is the 
decision on which venture to support. An average VC can receive several thousand 
business plans from different ventures per year, but invests in only 1-4% of 
applicants (Metrick, 2007).  
The expertise and experience of the VC industry is worth a closer look. Their success 
is directly tied to the success of the ventures they invest in, and therefore their core 
competence is to evaluate the chances of ventures in advance. There are several 
studies that examine the criteria VCs see as the most important when assessing a 
venture team and their business plan. Franke et al. (2004) performed a conjoint-
analysis to summarize results of 16 studies from the US and one from Germany. It 
revealed that the most important factor for VCs is the founder team’s branch 
experience. The team’s level of education, type of education and togetherness were 
identified as other main factors. Interestingly, the business plan itself is an inferior 
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criterion. There is a popular saying that gets it to the heart: “I would rather invest in 
strong management with an average business plan than in average management with 
a strong business plan”. It shows that in some cases, the access to capital (in the form 
of venture capital funding) is determined by the second important resource, Human 
Capital. Also for the acquisition of debt “It is quite conceivable that banks and other 
capital suppliers use education as a means to screen prospective entrepreneurs for 
whom little information is observed.” (van der Sluis, van Praag, & Vijverberg, 2004) 
 
2.2.2. HUMAN CAPITAL 
 
Human Capital is general term that describes the amount of skills, abilities and 
knowledge an individual possesses. The amount of Human Capital of a person has a 
serious impact on his or her performance in many aspects. The role of Human Capital 
as an important input factor was already recognized by Adam Smith (1776), who 
described it as one part of “the fixed capital, of which the characteristic is, that it 
affords a revenue or profit without circulating or changing masters”. The relationship 
that better education leads to higher income was verified by several empirical studies 
(Walsh, 1935). For a student, the gathering of Human Capital through schooling does 
not only incur tuition fees, but it also has an opportunity cost: If he decided to start a 
job already, he could instead earn income through labor. Nobel-Prize winner Gary 
Becker (1964) formalized that Human Capital investment brings returns, as any other 
resource, and integrated the idea into the microeconomic context.  
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2.2.3. SOCIAL CAPITAL 
 
“It’s not what you know, it’s who you know.” Social Capital can be interpreted 
broadly, but its general aim is to measure the potential access to persons or 
communities that can benefit the venture in different ways, directly or indirectly. 
Important persons could be venture capitalists or banks who provide financial 
support, customers, suppliers, providers of information, or potential new team 
members with skills helpful for the advance of the business; in that sense it has strong 
influence on access to the other types of capital. Direct measures are often the 
number or strength of social ties, whereas indirect measures use reputation or social 
achievements. 
Trouble starts with defining “access”: it is not clear in advance how “useful” a contact 
will turn out to be when it is needed, and if it keeps its promise. A researcher will 
often have to rely on subjective self-assessment of the target. There is no general way 
to operationalize and measure Social Capital: Some authors determine the strength of 
social ties by considering frequency of interactions or the type of relationship like 
“family” or “colleagues from work”; others additionally identify networks the target is 
involved in (Davidsson & Honig, 2003), or in a case of accounting firms, the number of 
ties to clients (Pennings, Lee, & van Witteloostuijn, 1998). Baron & Markman (2003) 
go “beyond Social Capital” and differ between Social Capital (in their case “favorable 
reputations, an established record in the field, a degree from an excellent university, 
work experience with ‘good’ employers”) and social competence. The latter they 
evaluate via questionnaires. Social networks, they argue, are a primary factor for 
gaining access to high-profile employees. In a second level, the financial outcomes are 
determined by social competence, influencing the quality of the relationships. 
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Social competence is also a direct reason for entry or exit decisions, when it comes to 
the role of interpersonal attraction. Social competence as a “soft skill” is required to a 
certain extent for collaboration in any context, and when choosing teammates, it may 
serve as an asset that outweighs other factors. 
 
2.3. REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
 
Because this study’s main idea is based on the concept of Human Capital, this section 
mainly presents empirical works that focus on this topic and its relevance for success. 
Existing literature covers several relations between different investments in Human 
Capital, such as schooling or work experience and entrepreneurial success. Results 
are ambiguous in some points, but they point in a common direction. 
On an individual level, a basic attribute is becoming an entrepreneur or not. This is 
referred to as selection or entrepreneurial entry. Robinson & Sexton (1994) analyze 
census data and find that each additional year of education increases the probability 
of becoming an entrepreneur by 0.8%. Together with the number of years an 
individual has worked after schooling, the impact on financial returns, a variable that 
measures success given entrepreneurial entry, is strongly significant. Kim, Aldrich & 
Keister (2006) conclude that Human Capital (education and work experience), unlike 
financial and cultural capital, is a strong driver for entrepreneurial entry. The term 
cultural capital means that the individual has entrepreneurship involved in his 
familial background: Indeed, a positive relationship seems plausible at first glance. 
Entrepreneurial activity demands much implicit knowledge which can only be 
attained on the job (see section 3.2.3. for a detailed explanation). This is confirmed by 
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the significant positive influence of entrepreneurial experience on success (Delmar & 
Shane, 2006). Lacking such experience may constitute an entry barrier that can be 
resolved more easily if useful knowledge is already in the family, which is therefore 
quickly accessible and transferrable. 
Also Davidsson & Honig (2003) identify previous entrepreneurial experience as a 
significant selection criterion and classify it as a part of what they define as tacit 
knowledge. Their findings about Social Capital are that strong ties have more benefit 
for selection, while at later stages weak ties, such as business networks, become 
important and benefit the gestation process and sales. A result that contradicts the 
works presented in the previous paragraph is found by van der Sluis, van Praag & 
Vijverberg (2004). Their meta-analysis reveals that schooling has no effect on 
selection, only on success. They blame their finding on a publication bias: Authors and 
journals are less likely to publish articles if they do not find a significant relationship 
for education. Van Praag (2006) adds that education is rarely subdivided in terms of 
faculty, suggesting that business-related education may have more benefits than 
business-unrelated education. Dickson, Solomon & Weaver (2008) account for this 
objection and find positive, although ambiguous evidence that business-related types 
of education push entry probability.  
Not to neglect the importance of Financial Capital, Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon & Woo 
(1994) clearly show its positive impact (besides Human Capital) on venture growth 
and survival in their analysis. Bates (1990) underlines that both human and Financial 
Capital as well as higher financial leverage are indicators for business longevity. 
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2.4. TEAM FORMATION AND COMPOSITION 
 
The previous section presented assets relevant for success. In order to maximize 
expected returns and given a choice, rational individuals want to join with others that 
provide highest levels of Human, Financial or Social Capital. They want to be rid of 
team members that contribute very little capital but reap an equal share of rewards. 
However, research on team formation in entrepreneurship points out additional 
important dimensions. An overview of existing literature on entrepreneurial team 
formation and factors associated with changes is given in order to classify this work 
in a broader context. 
Forbes et al. (2006) sum up three basic reasons for existing teams (or individuals) to 
add members. The first one, resource seeking behavior, is directly rational. It includes 
the need for a special function in the team, such as an accountant or a technician. The 
second motivation, interpersonal attraction, is guided by sociological principles of 
social ties and homophily. It has also a rational component: social ties hedge against 
the risk of distrustfulness. The better two persons know each other, the more they are 
able to overcome information asymmetry regarding their true skill and motivation. 
Finally, but merely to capture the full picture, they mention team additions against 
the will of the team. They may be caused by resolutions from outside institutions such 
as governments, banks, unions or other important stakeholders.  
 
Illustration 2: Reasons for adding Members (Forbes et al., 2006) 
Resource Seeking 
Financial 
Capital 
Human Capital 
(Functional) 
Social Capital 
Interpersonal Attraction 
Homophily Social Ties 
Against will 
Outside 
Institiutions 
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The choice for a particular member will often be influenced by more than one 
criterion. No matter which motivation is predominant, the addition or removal of a 
team member can always be explained as a matter of expected costs and benefits. 
Imagine the choice is between two candidates. It may contribute to total utility when 
deciding for a more sympathetic candidate than for one with higher operative skills. 
More sympathetic candidates may make up for a lack of capital input because they 
offer higher expected joy of teamwork or easier decision-making as a benefit. Not 
only for firm-internal matters, but also when it comes to interaction with outside 
parties, social competence can push higher returns through easier access to 
customers or negotiation power. Baron and Markman (2003) particularly identify the 
accuracy in perceiving others (social perception) and the ability to express emotions 
and feelings in an appropriate manner (expressiveness) as important social 
attributes. For team formation, this implicates that sympathetic candidates have 
better chances not for just “irrational” reasons, especially as sympathy can serve a 
signal for social competence. 
The following paragraphs present selected common findings about team formation 
and team turnover. Research findings for entrepreneurial teams are often similar to 
those concerning top management teams. This seems plausible, since in general the 
metamorphosis from one state of evolution into the other is rather blurry. 
 In order to give a better structure, research results are classified into three main 
topics, but the discussed articles do not exclusively cover the single issue they are 
listed below. The different approaches towards this complex matter make it difficult 
to pick out and define general empirical facts. 
 
15 
 
2.4.1. HOMOPHILY 
 
This effect is prevalent throughout the literature that deals with team composition 
and formation. “Birds of a feather flock together” is what the term basically means. 
“Homophily occurs when people with similar characteristics are attracted to one 
another, especially within distinct social boundaries, such as language and 
nationality, and when the structure of the social world makes it difficult for people 
with dissimilar characteristics to associate with one another” (Kim & Aldrich, 2005a). 
Thus, a certain share of homophily results out of basic conditions: when observing 
large samples of entrepreneurial teams, many teams are characterized by certain 
attributes that their members have in common. The probably most obvious 
tendencies are found with regard to the demographics ethnicity and gender. 
According to Hinds, Carley, Krackhardt & Wholey (2000), the choosing of workgroup 
members among students is guided by similarity of ethnicity as one of the most 
noticeable effects. Other, but less obvious reasons are the reputation for being 
competent (a signal for Human Capital) and ties from former working relationships, 
which has a similar logic to the above noted social ties. Ruef, Aldrich & Carter (2003) 
further find evidence that homophily also occurs when observing “achieved 
characteristics” such as occupation – meaning that people who had the same job are 
likely to be found within a team. In this context, they also discover low-status persons 
(“blue-collar workers”), women and ethical minorities to be underrepresented in the 
entrepreneurial community. The evolution of teams, meaning the adding and 
dropping of members during later periods of the gestation process, is guided by 
homophily rather than (functional) diversity (Kim & Aldrich, 2005b). Section 2.4.3. 
presents studies contradicting these statements. 
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2.4.2. STABILITY VERSUS TURNOVER 
 
The topic of some studies is the effect of team turnover on success. Arguments as well 
as empirical findings are ambiguous (Kim, Aldrich, & Ruef, 2005): On the one hand, 
team turnover may represent a reason for slower progress, when thinking of the 
consequences. Every entry and exit is associated with work of coordination. If a 
member exits, it leaves a gap and takes at least parts of the capital that it brought into 
the venture with it. Two examples are knowledge about the firm’s processes as a form 
of special Human Capital and a good relationship to customers and clients as a form 
of Social Capital. If a person joins, it takes time for him or her to fully integrate and 
adapt to the organization and the social setting within the venture, sometimes called 
the “business culture”. This may lead to a delay in achieving entrepreneurial 
milestones (Kim, Aldrich, & Ruef, 2005). On the other hand, turnover can be a positive 
signal, when considering its reasons: It may implicate that a team addresses the needs 
for additional resources that can only be obtained with the addition of new members 
(the three types of capital). Also, exits may be a result of rigorous firing of badly 
performing members, while other teams hesitate with such firm action and thus 
perform worse (Beckman, Burton, & O'Reilly, Early teams: The impact of team 
demography on VC financing and going public, 2007). In order to evaluate the impact 
of a change on success, case-specific scenarios must be analyzed to estimate what 
would have happened if there had been a change (or no change). 
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2.4.3. FUNCTIONAL DIVERSITY AND TRANSITION TO A TOP 
MANAGEMENT TEAM 
 
The term “Human Capital diversity” is sometimes used as a synonym for “functional 
diversity”. It must be noted that this refers to the qualitative aspect, addressing 
specific functional skills and knowledge (“outcomes” of Human Capital). It is 
appropriately used for describing teams whose members have done different 
apprenticeships or worked in other branches and hence have a broad spectrum of 
know-how available. It is different to “Human Capital heterogeneity” which this study 
primarily focuses on. It relates Human Capital to investments necessary for achieving 
skills and knowledge (“value” of Human Capital), not task-related outcomes of this 
investment (Unger, Rauch, Frese, & Rosenbusch, 2009). See section 3.2.1 for further 
discussion. 
Some scholars see functional diversity as a major key to entrepreneurial success 
(Brettel, Heinemann, Sander, Spieker, Strigel, & Weiß, 2009). The perfect start-up 
team consists of one expert in every area that challenges young businesses. Other 
studies suggest that too high diversity of functional background has downsides that 
outweigh benefits, mainly due to higher conflict potential and problems with 
implementation of key decisions (Ensley, Carland, & Carland, 1998). Similarly, one of 
the major findings of Knight et al. (1999) is that functional diversity leads to 
interpersonal conflict and less strategic consensus.  
The transition from the start-up team to a top management team is further 
investigated by Beckman & Burton (2004). A main discovery is that founding teams 
with lower experience transform into a weaker top management team than founding 
teams with high experience. This is not only because in general many founders stay 
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within their venture, but also because experienced founders are more likely to 
receive Venture Capital. VCs then improve the team and their managerial capabilities. 
Later, VC backing as well as functional diversity in the team leads to faster IPOs. The 
finding that high experienced entrepreneurs attract high profile managers is in 
compliance with the principle of Human Capital homogeneity, which will be 
understood after the following section. 
 
2.4.4. HUMAN CAPITAL HOMOGENEITY 
 
All empirical work presented previously concerns teams that have already started 
entrepreneurial activity and analyzes how they change. Finding a pattern for change 
events is also the aim of this work. But in order to understand the explanation offered 
here and to see the different theoretical approach, the view is now taken to the 
beginning, when a multitude of individuals and potential founders regroup 
themselves to active teams. 
Given that there exist firms and entrepreneurial partnerships, Fabel (2004) proofs 
that the allocation of individuals to organizations results in equilibrium. As noted 
above, a major success factor for outcomes of entrepreneurial projects is the 
combined Human Capital of the founding team. Since compensation of the owner-
managers in entrepreneurial partnerships is directly tied to economic returns, every 
rational individual will try to join the team with highest average ability levels. On the 
other side, also every already existing group will try to attract individuals with 
highest possible abilities for the same reason. When hiring low-quality individuals, 
the chance of failure for the venture increases. Assuming that Human Capital of 
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individuals is classified into levels, potential entrepreneurs will end up in a team that 
exactly matches their level: they would be rejected when trying to join a higher 
average-level team, and they themselves would not want to join a lower average-level 
team. This leads to an allocation of ability-matched teams – or Human Capital 
homogeneity. 
The compensation of human resource managers in established firms is fixed and 
therefore not (or only very little via the risk of failure and variable compensation 
systems) tied to their hiring decisions, thus they hire randomly. As a result of the 
random Human Capital mix, their returns are also too small to afford the wage of 
high-quality individuals – they will only attract low-quality individuals, which further 
lower the overall firm level. The final allocation is such that low-quality individuals 
are hired by firms, while high-quality individuals join homogenous entrepreneurial 
teams. 
Sonderegger (2009) finds empirical evidence for this effect when observing teams of 
nascent entrepreneurs in a large dataset. Ability matching seems to apply to team 
formation, an exception being teams where close familial ties are involved. A trust-
bonus seems to compensate for differences in (or a lack of) Human Capital. In his 
work, an index represents a relative measure of individual ability levels, since Human 
Capital consists of various factors. In order to measure team homogeneity, the 
standard deviation of the team members’ ability levels is a used as a tool. The result is 
that the standard deviation of the Human Capital index in existing teams is lower than 
if the same participating individuals were matched to teams randomly. 
Sonderegger (2009) observes a snapshot where teams have passed a small fraction of 
the pre-founding process. It is the idea of this work now to take a dynamic 
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perspective over a period of several following years. From the initial decision to 
found a Start-up, many teams find themselves in a constant process of evolution. An 
especially relevant factor for the ability profile is that nascent entrepreneurs leave 
and people from outside join. With every change of team composition, not only the 
available set of Human Capital alters – also homogeneity is directly affected with team 
entries and exits, because individuals have various scores for their ability indices. 
If the logic leading to Human Capital homogeneity applies, it is reasonable to expect 
that the existent homogeneity of the indices will further increase during the observed 
years. The pre-founding evolution just continues with the same systematic of 
reorganization that led to the team allocation at the time of the first observation. 
Additionally, information about true ability levels of team members increases over 
time and new members with matching ability levels may appear. It is expected that 
members with relatively low values are expelled from the team and above-the-(team-
)average members can find better outside opportunities in teams with a similar 
higher level.  
If team composition and resulting Human Capital homogeneity of the same set of 
entrepreneurial teams are measured at later points in time, the underlying process 
will have reached an advanced state. The system will converge towards a state of best 
matched teams in terms of Human Capital, so that at each point in time, Human 
Capital homogeneity of teams that exchanges members will be smaller than at the 
previous point. The following third section builds a framework for analysis and tests 
this idea. 
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3. ANALYSIS 
 
This section gives an overview and a summary of how the research is done, and the 
subsequent sections present methods and results in detail. 
First, universal Human Capital indices are constructed. They consist of weighted 
averages of several components such as years of education or years of work 
experience. Second, index values are calculated for each member of every team 
observed. The PSEDII Dataset provides all relevant information. Then, the standard 
deviation of these index values within each team is used as the basis for the dynamic 
analysis. After every year, differences are resolved if a team changes members. 
The first part finishes with a statistical analysis of several changes of standard 
deviation, but results show only a non-significant decline (which corresponds to an 
increase in homogeneity). Following this, other reasons and possible drivers for 
change events are investigated. First, team-specific demographics are compared 
between teams that change their composition and teams that do not. Then, focus is 
put on the individual level. Respectively, all members that were present at the first 
observation but exit at a later stage are compared to those who stay. Human Capital 
deviation is found to play a minor role as compared to other factors. The unexpected 
result is that the variable indicating the number of years the members know each 
other has a strong U-shaped influence on the probability of exit. The results do not 
support the hypothesis of growing Human Capital homogeneity during the Start-up 
phase, but they give new insights and ideas for further research in a different 
direction. 
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3.1. DATA 
 
The analysis is based on the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics II (PSEDII), 
published by the University of Michigan.1 Starting with telephone interviews in late 
2005, 1214 nascent entrepreneurs were identified. They were “person[s] who (a) 
considered themselves in the firm creation process; (b) had been engaged in some 
behavior to implement a new firm - such as having sought a bank loan, prepared a 
business plan, looked for a business location, or taken other similar actions; (c) 
expected to own part of the new venture; and (d) the new venture had not yet 
become an operating business” (Reynolds & Curtin, 2008). “Becoming operational” 
was defined as having achieved a cash flow that covered expenses and salaries for at 
least 6 months during a period of 12. Of each identified venture, the study collected a 
considerable amount of data, including type and state of the business, activities, 
finances, motivation, owner demographics and information about legal entity owners. 
Follow-up interviews were done every year, when the same respondents were asked 
about interim changes in their ventures. So far (September 2010), four yearly “waves” 
were published. The relevant parts for this study are those about team composition, 
team changes and demographics of old and new owners. 
The major downside of the dataset is that many samples are incomplete. Often, single 
important values are reported as missing, or even worse, ventures stop taking part in 
the interview or skip one or two waves. Reasons remain unclear and many samples 
must be dropped from the analysis because of this. Section 3.3.1. deals with 
systematic error handling. Also, many variables are only referring to the person who 
answers the questions. Personal relationships, for example, are recorded 
                                                                    
1 available at http://www.psed.isr.umich.edu/psed/home (accessed on 20.10.2010) 
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corresponding to the interviewee, but in groups of more than two people it 
constitutes a severe limitation to ignore the other owner’s relationships to each other. 
There is also no hint that the interviewee represents a “leading” figure in the team, 
which would allow giving his or her relationships a special meaning. For single 
ventures or two person teams, which account for over 88% of observations, this 
interview design flaw is irrelevant. But it is especially harmful for this analysis, since 
it depends on the remaining fraction of observations with two or more members. 
Another hurdle is that in the primary owner directory juristic persons are sometimes 
mixed together with natural persons. In this case it is a challenge to find out how 
many natural persons are currently members in the team, especially after delusive 
information is given on who left in a certain wave. 
More information about the initial assessment of the PSEDII is available in Reynolds 
and Curtin (2008). 
 
3.2. THE HUMAN CAPITAL INDICES 
 
The section about owner demographics in the PSEDII contains the data necessary to 
construct the Human Capital indices. The aim is to measure an individual’s Human 
Capital level relatively to others. Modifying the approach of Sonderegger (2009), 
three indices are built instead of one main index (Education, Work Experience and 
Entrepreneurial Experience). They are based on the same six sub-indices. Each sub-
index consists of one to three weighted variables taken directly from the PSEDII.  
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Illustration 3: Human Capital Indices (first Row) and Sub-Indices (second Row) 
In order to create a comparable score for each variable, every variable value is z-
transformed (standardized). The transformed value represents an individual 
outcome relatively to all others. 
 
Because different industries may have different standards or entry barriers for 
experience, each score is set specifically for the industry the current individual’s firm 
is operating in. This means that in the formula, the mean  and standard deviation s 
are derived only from the samples of this industry. For example, founders of ventures 
in the construction industry have an average of 13.7 years of education while 
entrepreneurs in communication have 15.6 (see Appendix 1 for industry averages of 
each variable). 
An advantage of standardization is that outliers have less influence on the score than 
with Sonderegger’s (2009) method of transformation on the minimum-maximum 
range. However, outliers will take values smaller than -1 and larger than +1 instead of 
being restricted by the interval [-1, 1]. Interpreting the values in years is no longer 
possible. After the transformation, a value below zero means under-average and 
above zero means over-average score. Shifting the mean to zero is in general referred 
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to as centering. An additional benefit for regression models is that if the variable is 
used as an independent, the constant terms (and coefficients in non-linear models) 
are valid at the mean instead of arbitrary or even meaningless zero-points (Kohler & 
Kreuter, 2009).   
 
3.2.1. EDUCATION 
 
Education is probably the most recognized element of Human Capital. Becker (1964) 
notes that across all developed and underdeveloped countries, “highly educated and 
skilled persons almost always tend to earn more than others” (Becker, 1964). 
Educated employees and workers bring higher rates of return to enterprises and are 
attracted and awarded with higher compensation. Furthermore, unemployment is 
strongly negatively related to education. 
For the first of the three indices the years of education are used to represent the level 
of education an individual experienced. It can only be used as a proxy because equal 
years of education do not exactly account for an equal level of knowledge. This is 
generally true for all index factors: a certain amount of time an individual invests for 
the growth of its Human Capital do not necessarily reflect the actual skills acquired. 
“Experience should not be equated with knowledge because experience may or may 
not lead to increased knowledge.” (Unger, Rauch, Frese, & Rosenbusch, 2009) There 
is a difference between investments in Human Capital and outcomes. 
For education in particular, this is reflected by the fact that there are different schools 
as well as different types of students. Schools and universities have different faculties, 
which may provide different qualities and more or less relevant kinds of knowledge 
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(see the criticism of Van Praag, 2006, presented in Section 2.3). Even two pupils 
attending the same schools and classes may have different success in acquiring the 
provided knowledge. 
Keeping these limitations in mind, an argument for the use of education is its 
signalling value. For the aim of observing team employment, it is helpful enough. 
Employers, irrespectively if they decide on behalf of a large firm or a small team, have 
to evaluate an individual’s educational knowledge based on data they display in their 
résumés. When deciding who to invite to a job interview, they have only a little more 
information about education than the PSEDII shows. Rather than knowing exactly 
which skills and knowledge a potential new member has, they also use the 
candidate’s educational background as a proxy. However, they will have a closer look 
at grades or use the interview to gain a better image; in some cases, they may have 
better information because they have already known the individual before; or, there 
is even a special trust-building relationship involved, such as friendship or 
recommendation. 
It is assumed that the highest level of education represents an employer’s perception 
of an individual’s schooling and university experience, which directly influences his 
decision whether to hire. Therefore, if the team change process is examined, the 
variable will be a useful signal for Human Capital.  
In the literature review of Unger et al. (2009), general education was used in 69 out of 
70 studies that linked entrepreneurial success to Human Capital. “Years of education” 
was taken in 11 out of these 69 studies (see also Robinson and Sexton, 1994). The 
remaining mostly got along with differently modelled “Levels of education”, an 
example being Cooper et al. (1994), who use a dummy variable that indicates a 
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bachelor’s degree or higher. In their Meta-analysis, van der Sluis, van Praag & 
Vijverberg (2004) point out that many authors arbitrarily assign scores or dummies 
to certain levels of education or degrees, harming comparability to other studies. To 
obtain a plausible relative estimation of different levels of education, the PSEDII-
variable “highest level of education” (coded as AH62 in the dataset) is transformed 
into “years of education”, according to the official US Department of Education’s key 
(see Appendix 2). 
The number of years that corresponds to an individual’s reported level of education 
are standardized and form the first index, Edu: 
 
 
3.2.2. WORK EXPERIENCE 
 
The second index consists of three equally weighted variables, here followed by their 
abbreviation (in brackets) and the codename in the PSEDII: 
 Years of Work Experience in the industry where the new business will 
compete (YWEI) – AH11 
 Years of full-time, paid Work Experience, regardless of industry (YPWE) – 
AH20 
 Years of tenure in managerial, supervisory, or administrative responsibilities 
(YMSAR) – AH21 
                                                                    
2 Names of the PSEDII variables are included here because most readers have probably worked with 
the dataset themselves. 
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Since there is no further explanation, one could assume that AH11 does not include 
the years reported in AH20. But taking a look at the dataset shows that the value of 
the second variable is not necessarily greater or equal to the first. Many respondents 
would violate this requirement as they report higher numbers for AH11 than for 
AH20 (the same is true for AH21). Obviously, the first variable includes also years 
without a full-time (and/or paid) tenure.  
Work Experience is clearly a useful indicator for Human Capital. Many important 
skills for all business-related applications can only be learned by doing. The first 
variable (YWEI) is an indicator for practical knowledge about a certain industry’s 
processes, markets or business culture. It may be of higher value in the same branch 
that it originates from than in others. Therefore, it brings Becker’s (1964) definition 
of Specific training to mind. It is “training that has no effect on the productivity of 
trainees that would be useful in other firms” (Becker, 1964). Some authors strictly 
classify years of work experience as general and years of industry experience as 
specialized Human Capital (Brüderl et al., 1992, Pennings et al., 1998). There are 
some arguments against this classification. First, there is no kind of knowledge that 
can be classified either as perfectly specific or general at the time of acquisition. 
There might appear another use for assumedly specific knowledge in a different area. 
Also, “general” skills gathered may turn out to match the definition of specific 
knowledge at a later point in time, an example being programming skills that are soon 
obsolete or only used for very specific applications. And second, in every year 
reported in this variable, different kinds of skills are learned at the same time, many 
of which are clearly beneficial in a general way (for instance the basic use of a 
computer).  
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It would also be wrong to assume that the second variable (YPWE) qualifies for 
Becker’s (1964) definition of “General knowledge”. If a person had two years of Work 
Experience the automotive industry, and one year of the two was full-time and paid, 
the value reported for the “general” variable AH20 would be one. However, in this 
case the gained knowledge cannot be classified differently than the first variable. 
Arguments for the importance of industry experience are also found in Delmar and 
Shane (2006). They analyse the impact of Human Capital and other factors on 
performance of new ventures. Industry experience has three main benefits for firm 
performance: First, information on customer demand in a certain industry is often 
only accessible by industry participation. Only previous collaboration reveals special 
needs and sales opportunities that offer a strategic advantage for a new venture. 
Second, some skills necessary for technical and industry-specific business processes 
are learned only on-the-job in the regarding branch. And third, social ties to suppliers, 
distributors and customers are established over time and brought into the new 
venture for benefit. This represents an asset of Social Capital, but is assumed to be 
strongly related to industry tenure. Since the effects of Social Capital are not tested 
for in this study, many of its factors will remain consolidated in the monitored 
variables. 
Similar to the first index, there are limitations when using years of tenure to 
represent Work Experience. There are many other ways how Work Experience can be 
operationalized. An overview of various methods used in the literature for linking 
Work Experience to job performance are found in the review of Quinones et al. 
(1995). More exact measures refer to specific tasks: they range from the total number 
of tasks or the number of times a specific task is performed by an individual to the 
difficulty of the specific task. Such data is not available for entrepreneurs and would 
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go beyond the scope of this analysis (it is available in other areas, for example when 
recruits of the US Air Force are trained – it is important to classify experience of jet 
pilots in detail). A less exact method is just assessing the type or counting the number 
of organizations an individual worked with. Table 1 shows how Quinones et al. 
(1995) differ between measurements of work experience. The horizontal axis 
represents the unit of measurement and the vertical axis shows the level of specifity. 
In this case, specifity means how close work experience is examined, from its 
organizational context down to a high differentiation of exact tasks. The approach in 
this study is time (years) spent in an organization or on a job, highlighted red. The 
next section introduces also the number of organizations (green) as a proxy for 
entrepreneurial experience. 
 
Table 1: Measurement of Work Experience (Quinones et al., 1995) 
Unger et al. (2009) say that out of their 70 reviewed studies, 22 included “Specific 
Industry Experience”, 12 “Work Experience” and 21 “Management experience” in 
their analyses. A closer look is taken only on “Management experience” (YMSAR): 
only 5 used the number of years as an indicator; the others used a binary value (yes 
or no), or the “level” of management. 
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In their meta-analytical part, Delmar and Shane (2006) show that Industry-specific 
experience of entrepreneurial teams is found to be positively related to survival in 8 
out of 11 previous studies. In their own investigation they go deeper into detail: By 
using the natural logarithm of the time variables, they test for positive declining 
marginal returns of the years of experience. This sounds reasonable, because learning 
curves for workers and employees may mostly be steeper in the first year of 
employment than at a later point in time. Because , they add 1 to every 
value, in order to obtain a zero to zero transformation (otherwise, a tenure of zero 
years would not be defined in the logarithmic transformation). With linear 
regression, they find positive significant impact of the transformed variable to sales, 
which supports their assumption of declining marginal returns. 
 
Illustration 4: The Effect of ln-Transformation 
If Years of Industry Experience have a positive logarithmic impact on venture sales, it 
seems fair to argue that the same logarithmic effect will appear in the analysis here. 
When teams evaluate potential new members, they probably do it in a way that an 
additional year of experience has a relatively greater benefit for a person with only a 
few that for one with many years. However, it is assumed that when deciding for 
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member employment, the linear relationship is sufficient and ln-transformation will 
therefore not be applied here (in fact, the logarithmic transformation was performed 
but revealed similar results). 
 
INTERNAL CONSISTENCY 
 
Attention is now given to the relative weights of each of the three variables. In order 
to estimate them, reliability of each variable is assessed. If they all are a reliable 
measure the property Work Experience, all three must (at least tend to) be higher for 
individuals that receive a higher score. It is necessary to take a look into every 
individual’s variables YWEI, YPWE and YMSAR – the so-called internal consistency 
can be tested with Cronbach’s Alpha: 
 
N is the number of items, followed by the average covariance between the items. The 
lower part of the fraction is the sum of all Elements in the variance-covariance matrix 
(Field, 2009). In Stata, the command line alpha followed by the variable’s names 
results in the desired output. The rest of the command line eliminates samples with 
missing values (in Stata, missing values are commonly coded as a dot, which has an 
infinitely high value), and the option std, which performs the z-transformation. 
 Scale reliability coefficient:      0.7142
Number of items in the scale:            3
Average interitem correlation:      0.4545
Test scale = mean(standardized items)
. alpha AH11 AH20 AH21 if (AH11 <. & AH20 <. & AH21 <.), std
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The scale reliability coefficient in the last row with a value of 0.71 is Cronbach’s alpha. 
A value of 1 means perfect reliability when all correlations equal 1, while a value of 0 
means no reliability at all. Often, values of at least 0.7 are recommended to assume 
reliability (Janssen & Laatz, 2010). For a discussion about values and interpretation of 
Cronbach’s Alpha see Field (2009). Here, the found coefficient of internal consistency 
allows equal weighting each variable for the Work Experience sub-index; this is 
different to Sonderegger’s (2009) approach, which applies principal component 
analysis to estimate weights. The same proceeding is used for the sub-index of 
Entrepreneurial Experience (see below). 
The following formula is used to calculate the second index, Work Experience: 
 
 
3.2.3. ENTREPRENEURIAL EXPERIENCE 
 
The third index accounts for experience which the owner gathered with other 
ventures than the observed one. Some authors refer to “Start-Up Experience”. In the 
PSEDII it is addressed with the variable AH12, “Numbers of other start-ups helped 
starting” (NSU). The second variable observed here is AH13, “Number of other 
Businesses owned” besides the Business discussed in the interview (NB). It may 
include also ventures that the entrepreneur joined at a later stage. “Entrepreneurial 
Experience” is therefore defined more broadly than “Start-Up Experience”.  
A wide range of skills and abilities that are vital for start-up success can only be 
gained via direct confrontation with real-life problems. The range of organizational 
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and operational challenges for entrepreneurs is endless and probably very different 
for every single young firm. The owners are nevertheless able to learn how to manage 
the issues occurring, be it legal requirements, acquisition of Financial Capital, hiring 
employees, development of products or dealing with stakeholders. Even in the case of 
business failure, substantial parts of the knowledge will be acquired by trial-and-
error. 
On a psychological level, experience is necessary for the improvement of 
communication- and leadership skills or the ability to cope with stressful situations. 
Decision making, identifying information channels and opportunities also requires a 
development of intuition or what one would call an entrepreneurial “gut feel”. 
Another asset that grows with the years of entrepreneurial tenure is the social 
network. Equally with the Social Capital gained through work experience, existing ties 
to investors, customers, suppliers, or partners are transferred and helpful the new 
venture. (Delmar & Shane, 2006) 
After education, Start-Up experience is the second most often used type of Human 
Capital indicators in Unger et al. (2009). In their review, 31 out of 70 studies include 
it as a highly task-related factor. Delmar and Shane (2006) apply the same 
logarithmic transformation to start-up experience as they do for years of industry 
experience, which again induces declining marginal returns of additional venture 
experience. Their conclusion is that small amounts of entrepreneurial experience 
have a positive effect just on venture survival. Only if the owners founded four or 
more previous start-ups, the amount of experience is also enough to significantly 
boost sales. 
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Again, Cronbach’s alpha shows high internal consistency, which allows equal-
weighting (see the above section for a more detailed explanation). 
 
The last index, Entrepreneurial Experience, is therefore calculated with 
 
 
3.3. MEASURING HUMAN CAPITAL HOMOGENEITY 
 
The PSEDII issues four Waves A, B, C and D. In yearly intervals, the same respondents 
are interviewed again to report changes of their situation, milestones completed and 
demographics about new owner-members and information on who left the team. 
Each year, a team might consist of different individuals with different Human Capital 
indices. The person interviewed is assumed to remain the same, since there is never a 
hint suggesting otherwise. In this section, possible changes and the concept of 
homogeneity are explained, as well as how to treat different situations where data is 
missing. 
  
Scale reliability coefficient:      0.7241
Number of items in the scale:            2
Average interitem correlation:      0.5675
Test scale = mean(standardized items)
. alpha AH12 AH13 if (AH12 <. & AH13 <.), std
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3.3.1. POSSIBLE CHANGES AND ERRORS 
 
The following illustration represents four exemplary teams that capture all possible 
events that occur during the transitions. Teams evolve from left to right over three 
waves. For easier understanding, the last wave D is left out here. 
 
Illustration 5: Possible Transformations 
TEAM 1 
Team 1 (three blue persons) stays the same during all three waves. This requires that 
in each wave the interviewee reports “no change” in the PSEDII question XG0a3: “In 
our (previous/last) interview, you indicated that you (alone/and […]) (would) own 
the new business. Is this still correct?” Because wave A represents the initial 
situation, no change is documented there. Since there is no difference in homogeneity, 
such teams have no impact on the analysis. 
  
                                                                    
3 X is to be replaced with the corresponding letter of the waves B, C or D. Henceforth the letter X is 
ignored when referring to variable names – the particular wave reference letter should be clear from 
context. 
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TEAM 2 
In wave B, owner number 2 leaves the venture; this is indicated by the red cancel 
icon. Also, a new member is added; this is represented by the red person symbol at 
the end. In wave C, one additional member enters (the green symbol). Note that the 
changes of wave B are still displayed. The structure of the PSEDII allows the 
recording of data for up to five slots per team, where each slot can be filled with data 
of one individual. In wave B, one additional slot was established. This means that 
teams larger than five persons in wave A or larger than six persons after wave B 
cannot be fully reported; in this case, at least one person’s data is missing. Also if a 
person leaves the team, his or her now empty slot is for some reason not filled with a 
new member’s data. This is a substantial limitation to the whole dataset and the 
analysis. See below how such errors are handled. 
TEAM 3 
For some reason, this team has not reported data in wave B. This is referred to as 
Error 1. Normally, an Error 1 would mean the venture is not kept track of any more by 
the PSEDII. However, in wave C, the team again did take part in the interview, it just 
skipped wave B. This special occurrence allows further use of the sample: It is 
assumed that all changes reported in wave C happened in the year directly before the 
last interview (indicated as green signs). Since it is not important when exactly 
changes occur, teams with Error 1 are not immediately dropped from the analysis. 
TEAM 4 
An example for Error 2 is illustrated: here, data of one team member is missing 
partially or totally. Since the index cannot be calculated if, for instance, the level of 
education is not reported, the standard deviation of the team cannot be 
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reconstructed. Another example for the severe Error 2 is when the previous Team 
number three would not report any data after Wave A. Assuming the venture has 
failed is not legit, because there is no proof for that. First, there is an own dedicated 
variable that indicates venture failure (which in many of these cases is not reported); 
second, it could be possible that the interviewee simply decided not to respond or 
could not be reached. Probably the team is not traced anymore because person 
number 1, who was contacted for the previous interviews, left the venture. If an Error 
2 occurs for whatsoever reason, the whole team must be dropped from the sample. 
 
3.3.2. FEASIBLE OBSERVATIONS 
 
The following diagram gives an overview of how many of the 1214 observations in 
the sample were inflicted by errors: 
 
Illustration 6: Fractions of Samples containing Errors 
Samples that have Error 2 occurring are immediately dropped; Error 1 samples can 
be used if, for example, only waves B and C are missing, but A and D are fully 
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available. In order to identify relevant samples for the analysis, another limitation is 
fundamental: If a venture is owned only by a single entrepreneur, no standard 
deviation can be calculated. A similar situation is constituted by cases when there is 
only one owner left after a change. The following frequency table shows team sizes in 
the first wave.  
 
Table 2: (Initial) Team Sizes in the PSEDII 
More than half of the teams start as single individual enterprises. Because of the five 
available slots, team sizes larger than five automatically constitute an Error 2. The 
real homogeneity cannot be derived in such cases. Some solo entrepreneur may form 
a team at a later stage, and some team ventures may be left with only one person. 
These cases are accounted for in the sample. The most important and largest 
restriction for the sample is, however, that changes can only be observed where 
changes actually occur. 
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The 1214 samples cover three “transitions” between the four waves, during which 
changes of team homogeneity could be realized. This results in 3642 possible events 
of change within the teams. Summing up, the following restrictions limit this pool: 
 Transitions without changes – This includes teams that stopped providing 
data (most of the Error 1 teams) 
 Transitions that involve only one person before or after 
 Transitions after a team provided incomplete data (Error 2) 
These restrictions limit the sample size to only 44 feasible and measureable events of 
change. All different versions of change events are explained in the preceding section. 
They are also indicated by the PSEDII variable XG0a, which has four possible 
realizations: 
 Added member(s) 
 Deleted member(s) 
 Both of the above 
 No change 
 
3.3.3. HOMOGENEITY 
 
In each of the four waves, a team has a certain constellation of members. Section 3.2 
explained how the three indices are calculated for each individual. For the remaining 
ventures in the sample, standard deviation of the indices is now derived for each 
reported state as a measure for homogeneity, or correctly speaking, heterogeneity. 
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N is the current number of team members, xi is a member’s value of the observed 
index, and µ is the current mean of the index in the observed team. Ceteris paribus, a 
higher standard deviation means lower homogeneity. 
The aim is to analyze the development of the Human Capital homogeneity 
represented by three indices. It is assumed that homogeneity will increase over the 
observed period. The standard deviations of the indices should therefore decrease. 
The illustration shows why this is expected to happen.  
 
Illustration 7: Example for an expected Team Change Event 
In the example, one of the three indices is observed in year t and in the following year 
t+1. Index scores are symbolized by the size of the figure and displayed below as a 
percentage of the maximum. The person with the highest indices leaves during the 
transition. There is also another person, whose index is almost equal to the team’s 
average, joining the team. Both the departure and the arrival constitute factors that 
decrease the standard deviation of the index. The same effect would occur if the 
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person with the minimum index (the smallest one) leaves the venture. This leads to 
the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: The standard deviation of the index for education will decrease after 
adding or dropping a member. 
Hypothesis 2: The standard deviation of the index for work experience will decrease 
after adding or dropping a member. 
Hypothesis 3: The standard deviation of the index for entrepreneurial experience 
will decrease after adding or dropping a member. 
To test the hypotheses, every change is observed closely and the change in the 
standard deviation calculated. 
 
According to the hypotheses,  of all three indices should tend to be negative. A 
first impression is given by the histogram of all calculated changes of the dataset.  
 
Illustration 8: Observed Changes of Standard Deviation (Histogram) 
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Because all changes are values relative to their absolute scale, it is not inappropriate 
to fit all three variables into one graph. It shows that the differences are almost 
symmetrically distributed around zero, so there is no obvious tendency. A t-test for 
the mean being zero gives the detailed insight. The Stata command ttest is followed 
by the variable name and “== 0” (which simply reads “equals zero”). Technically, the 
correct hypothesis is “the mean of the changes is zero”, which means that the event of 
a team change generally does not affect the Human Capital Homogeneity in either 
direction. If the results do not support this hypothesis, the alternative would be that 
there exists a significant tendency. 
 
 
 
 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.1131         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.2263          Pr(T > t) = 0.8869
    Ha: mean < 0                 Ha: mean != 0                 Ha: mean > 0
Ho: mean = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       43
    mean = mean(delta_Edu)                                        t =  -1.2276
                                                                              
delta_~u        44    -.054142     .044104    .2925528   -.1430862    .0348022
                                                                              
Variable       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
One-sample t test
. ttest delta_Edu == 0
 Pr(T < t) = 0.7843         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.4314          Pr(T > t) = 0.2157
    Ha: mean < 0                 Ha: mean != 0                 Ha: mean > 0
Ho: mean = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       43
    mean = mean(delta_WE)                                         t =   0.7942
                                                                              
delta_WE        44    .0310505    .0390969    .2593398    -.047796     .109897
                                                                              
Variable       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
One-sample t test
. ttest delta_WE == 0
 Pr(T < t) = 0.3811         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.7621          Pr(T > t) = 0.6189
    Ha: mean < 0                 Ha: mean != 0                 Ha: mean > 0
Ho: mean = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       43
    mean = mean(delta_EE)                                         t =  -0.3046
                                                                              
delta_EE        44   -.0131878     .043296    .2871933   -.1005026    .0741269
                                                                              
Variable       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
One-sample t test
. ttest delta_EE == 0
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First reported means come to attention. They are slightly negative for Education and 
Entrepreneurial Experience, therefore supporting the idea of shrinking standard 
deviation, and slightly positive for Work Experience (contradicting the expectation). 
But a look at the 95% confidence interval in the summary statistics gives more 
insight. Its interpretation is that if many random samples were drawn out of the 
population and for each one the mean and the confidence interval estimated, 95% of 
all intervals would contain the population’s real mean.4 Depending on the distribution 
and the number of observations, the boundaries of the interval vary. Because in all 
three cases it contains zero, the basic hypothesis – that the mean is equal to zero – 
cannot be rejected at this level of confidence.  
The last section of the output shows the p-values (written as “Pr(T < t)”), here is how 
to interpret them. A confidence level of 95% can be derived from 1-α = 95%, where α 
is called the significance level. Because their values are all larger than usual values of 
α of 0.05 or even 0.1, it cannot be assumed that the mean is lower, higher, or simply 
unequal to zero.5 
The results do not support the whole idea of increasing Human Capital homogeneity. 
However, it must be noted that confidence intervals shrink if the sample size is larger. 
Perhaps gathering more data could lead to a clearer and different picture. 
A different approach using Sonderegger’s (2009) combined single index is found in 
Appendix 3. It was conducted as an earlier version of the current analysis and uses 
three levels of assumptions in order to include samples with errors. Nevertheless the 
results are the same as reported here. 
 
                                                                    
4 http://psydok.sulb.uni-saarland.de/volltexte/2004/268/html/node146.html (accessed on 
20.9.2010) 
5 http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/output/ttest_output.htm (accessed on 20.9.2010) 
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3.4. TEAM LEVEL FACTORS FOR ENTRY AND EXIT 
 
3.4.1. HYPOTHESES 
 
If the suggested mechanism that leads to Human Capital homogeneity is not as 
important for entrepreneurial team change, there might be another explanation. In 
this section, the analysis focuses on variables that characterize entrepreneurial 
ventures at the team level. Perhaps, there is a difference in the teams that change in 
comparison to teams that do not. For the structured investigation it is also sensible to 
differ between events of team exits and entries, as in Ucbasaran et al. (2003). Two 
binary dummy variables are introduced, one that is equal to “1” if the team 
experiences an exit and “0” if it does not, and one that does the same for an entry. The 
standard deviations of the indices and the means are again included in the checked 
variables. 
Higher means of the Human Capital indices account for highly experienced 
(professional) teams. More experience may increase the chance for team changes in 
both directions. This is reasonable because professional teams may know better 
when outside knowledge is needed; they may have a larger and better social network 
that allows sourcing members for potential entry; professionals in a team may be 
quicker to identify outside opportunities to change to, and their social network 
facilitates access; finally, they may realize problems with active members earlier and 
react with expulsion if necessary. A conflicting argument was discussed in section 
2.4.2.: team stability has advantages for performance. Coordination issues associated 
with member entry and exit may take time and slow down the founding process (Kim, 
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Aldrich, & Ruef, 2005). A professional team might anticipate these problems and start 
with the right team from the beginning. 
A higher standard deviation means more heterogeneity. In the previous section, no 
evidence was found indicating that teams tend to decrease or increase it with team 
changes. This, however, does not tell anything about the relationship between 
diversity and probability of team change. Perhaps, diversity pushes team turnover, 
but who to recruit or expel is more the outcome of a random process regarding 
Human Capital attributes. Diverse founder teams consist of people of different levels 
of education, work- and entrepreneurial experience and probably have a different 
social background. It is possible that there is a cluster of entrepreneurial teams that 
tend to form spontaneously when the right people meet (or by “entrepreneurial 
casting” of an institution), as opposed to teams of friends that know each other from 
college or work – which would more likely share similar skill levels. The 
“spontaneous” team may be exposed to more internal social friction. 
On the other hand, if the personal relationship is a long-time friendship or even 
partnership, it may compensate for lack of hard skills as a prime “trust bonus” 
(Sonderegger, 2009). To investigate the impact of personal relationships, the PSEDII 
offers the variable H7 which reports for how many years the interviewee has known 
each member of the team. On a team level, this effect can be tested only on an average 
basis – the mean of the years the interviewee has reported to know his or her 
teammates. It is more plausible to assess the personal relationships on an individual 
level; this follows in the next section. 
The average age of the team may especially lead to exits into retirement, and is 
therefore included. Also here, an individual test for exit probability seems promising. 
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Technically, it is reasonable to assume that with increasing team size the probability 
of a team exit gets bigger. The straightforward logic is that each member is exposed to 
ambiguous events that influence his or her decision to quit. The average probability 
for a member to exit can be determined. As a result, with each additional member in a 
team the combined probability that just one of them leaves increases. A less technical 
reason for member exit may be that a larger team might face growing organizational 
and structural difficulties. But in contrast, handling more work, advanced processes 
or an extended customer network even requires more people. Ucbasaran et al. (2003) 
find support that smaller teams report entries more often than larger teams. As an 
explanation, they suggest that they have limited functional diversity and need new 
members to fill those gaps. 
 
3.4.2. LOGISTIC REGRESSION 
 
All available variables are included in a logistic regression. Its aim is to identify 
systematics between independent variables and a dichotomous dependent variable, 
in this case a dummy for a realized team change. Contrary to linear regression, the 
relationship to the independent variables is interpreted as the logarithmic chance of 
the dependent event happening. The natural logarithm of the odds ratio allows the 
probability coefficient to stay in within the [0, 1] interval. It is further appropriate to 
center all continuous variables. Because the logarithmic relationship leads to 
different coefficients at different values of the variable (unlike in a linear 
relationship), it is reasonable to observe the coefficient at a “meaningful point” 
(Kohler & Kreuter, 2009). Note that “meaningful points” could also be others than the 
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mean, for instance if the sample is heavily clustered: Effects on “typical observations” 
could then be estimated when centering the variables on their cluster means. Some 
argue that best practice would be to even calculate the coefficients at every observed 
value and report the mean of them (Hoetker, 2007). 
For both regressions, all independent variables are taken from the state in wave A. 
The dependent dummy variables, exit and entry, are set to 1 if there is a 
corresponding team change reported in any wave thereafter. Also, the sample is 
limited to observations with more than one person in wave A as well as to errorless 
ones. 
Independent variables (for correlation tables, see Appendix 4): 
 cMean_Edu_1, cMean_WE_1, cMean_EE_1: centered means of the three Human 
Capital Sub-indices in wave A 
 cStd_Edu_1, cStd_WE_1, cStd_EE_1: centered standard deviations of the Sub-
indices in wave A 
 cMean_YK: centered mean years the founder knows his or her partners 
 cteamsize: centered team size 
 cMean_Age: centered mean age of the owners 
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A positive coefficient is interpreted as the rise in logarithmic odds if the variable 
increases by one. For an interpretation with probabilities, the nonlinear relationship 
is best understood by visualizing it with a graph. The probability of the event exit 
occurring in a team is predicted for each value of an independent variable. For team 
size, the only variable which has highly significant impact on exit with a p-value of 
0.000 (found in the fifth column of the variables table), this looks as follows: 
                                                                              
       _cons    -2.089226   .3285133    -6.36   0.000      -2.7331   -1.445352
   cteamsize      1.55092   .4285023     3.62   0.000     .7110711    2.390769
    cMean_YK    -.0132113   .0307339    -0.43   0.667    -.0734485     .047026
   cStd_EE_1     .6293954   .8269689     0.76   0.447    -.9914338    2.250225
   cStd_WE_1    -1.024177    .896493    -1.14   0.253    -2.781271    .7329174
  cStd_Edu_1     .4805177   1.084126     0.44   0.658    -1.644331    2.605366
  cMean_EE_1    -.6758555   .5804984    -1.16   0.244    -1.813611    .4619004
  cMean_WE_1     .4024032   .5600368     0.72   0.472    -.6952489    1.500055
 cMean_Edu_1     .4806936   .3808332     1.26   0.207    -.2657258    1.227113
                                                                              
        exit        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
Log pseudolikelihood = -40.338027                 Pseudo R2       =     0.2428
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0003
                                                  Wald chi2(8)    =      29.13
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        125
                                                                              
       _cons    -3.006204   .4813772    -6.25   0.000    -3.949686   -2.062722
   cteamsize     .4874731    .423351     1.15   0.250    -.3422795    1.317226
    cMean_YK     .0007107    .022083     0.03   0.974    -.0425711    .0439925
   cStd_EE_1    -.2893571   1.482861    -0.20   0.845    -3.195711    2.616997
   cStd_WE_1     1.885078   1.382552     1.36   0.173    -.8246753    4.594831
  cStd_Edu_1     2.496994   1.042989     2.39   0.017     .4527727    4.541216
  cMean_EE_1     .4759327   .7873326     0.60   0.546    -1.067211    2.019076
  cMean_WE_1     .2089916   .7914642     0.26   0.792     -1.34225    1.760233
 cMean_Edu_1    -.4755848   .3673843    -1.29   0.195    -1.195645    .2444751
                                                                              
       entry        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
Log pseudolikelihood = -29.451036                 Pseudo R2       =     0.2091
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0155
                                                  Wald chi2(8)    =      18.88
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        125
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Illustration 9: Predicted Probability of an Exit-Event (Phat2) with Team Size 
Because it is not a continuous function, it is obvious that the probability difference 
between 2 and 3 team members is smaller than the difference between 3 and 4, 
where the line is steeper. Anyways, the relationship is almost linear, and it seems that 
additional team members increase chances of an exit appearing just as an effect of 
summation, as suggested. Because all variables were centered, the constant term in 
the last row of the output represents the logarithmic odds of a hypothetical all-
average team to experience a team change. It can be transferred into a probability 
with 
 
where L is the coefficient and Y the dependent variable. It equals an overall chance of 
11% for exit and 5% for entry. 
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There is also a p-value for the whole model, found in the third row of the output’s 
upper right section. Compared to usual levels of α (0.1, 0.05, 0.01), it is very low in the 
first model and a little higher at the second, which indicates a proper model fit. 
The second model has one significant variable: cStd_Edu_1. This shows that the odds 
for entry increase for teams with higher diversity in the education index. This 
deserves a closer look. Appendix 5 shows a list with all teams that experience an 
entry, sorted by deviation in the highest level of education of the owners. It shows 
that the teams with the highest deviations are almost always teams with partners or 
relatives involved. This is in accord with the finding that the “trust-bonus” resulting 
from personal relationships can compensate for differences in Human Capital 
(Sonderegger, 2009). An explanation for the higher entry probability might be that 
“family ventures” built on trust will sooner or later realize that external knowledge is 
needed, or that other members of the family are brought into the venture. Ucbasaran 
et al. (2003) already investigated this hypothesis but did not find support. The impact 
of personal relationships is examined on the individual level in the next section. 
 
3.5. INDIVIDUAL FACTORS FOR EXIT 
 
Here, the aim is to find significant specifications of persons that leave nascent 
entrepreneurial teams. It is a chance to get the most detailed look into personal 
reasons for team exits. Therefore, all individuals of wave A who reportedly stay or 
leave are compared with logistic regression. 
The first step is to rearrange the PSEDII dataset in a proper manner. Rather than 
groups of individuals being observed, every individual becomes a sample now. 
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Demographics are taken from wave A, and again, a dummy variable is introduced that 
marks if the individual is reported as leaving the team in one of the subsequent 
waves. This is determined by the PSEDII question G4c “Is owner X still an owner?”. 
The interviewees therefore also have to give a positive statement if the person has 
not left. Only in this case, the dummy variable is assigned zero. 
For every variable, it is now possible to calculate an individual’s difference from its 
colleagues’ mean. This method is best suited to quantify the characteristics of a 
person compared to the others, without having him or her influence the mean. The 
following example illustrates a possible proceeding in an exemplary team for the 
variable age: 
 
Illustration 10: Average Difference of Age 
Here, the team consists of four people with the ages 30, 34, 35 and 50. Their ages are 
marked on the horizontal “age” line. The age difference is calculated for the oldest 
member (the green square). First, the mean of the remaining members is marked as 
33 (the blue squares). Then, the length of the red line symbolizes the average 
difference to the oldest member. Its length is 17. The same calculation is done for 
every member and other variables with the help of Excel VBA. 
  
30 35 34 50 
Average = 33 
20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55
Age of Team Members 
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3.5.1. HYPOTHESES 
 
After these arrangements it is possible to develop new hypotheses. First, the effect of 
age can be assessed on an individual basis. It seems plausible that old owners will 
tend to quit and probably leave into retirement. Also, the effect of average age 
difference to his or her colleagues (the example from the previous section) could lead 
to an exit: If a member is much older or younger than the rest of the venture, it might 
become difficult to match individual aims. Older members might become more risk-
averse or less interested in keeping track of new developments. 
A similar argument is applicable for each Human Capital sub-index. Also here, the 
average difference on the scale is assessed. As argued at the beginning, it might seem 
reasonable for rational higher-than-average owners to search outside opportunities, 
as well as for whole teams to expel lower-than-average members. However, this 
would inevitably lead to the same negative impact on the indices’ standard deviations 
as tested for in the first analysis (Human Capital homogeneity), which no evidence 
was found for. In compliance with the above results, it is reasonable to assume that 
there will be no significant effect of these three variables. 
If there is an effect regarding gender, it can be traced with the dummy variable male, 
which is set to one for men and zero for women. Although a topic of recent 
controversy is introduced here, it can be hypothesized that women are still more 
likely to leave because of pregnancy or child care. 
As already discussed above, the personal relationship might have a strong influence, 
because of the development of a so-called “trust-bonus” via social ties. It can be 
misleading that there is no information about the other owner’s interpersonal 
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relationships. However, a long-term acquaintanceship might well have a negative 
influence on the chance for exit. It is further reported what exact relationship the 
interviewee has to each other individual. Here, the following ordinal categories are 
created out of the PSEDII information from question H8 (in brackets) as dummies: 
 Partners (“Spouses” and “Partners sharing a household”) 
 Relatives (“Relatives living in the same household” and “Partners living in 
different households”) 
 Friends (“Friends or acquaintances from work” and “Friends or acquaintances 
you have not worked with”) 
 Strangers (“Strangers before joining the new business team”) 
The proximity of the relationships is sorted in a decreasing order. It is suspected that 
nearer relationships such as “Spouses” account for less probability of the 
corresponding person leaving. 
The last variable of interest concerns how much effort the person has put in the 
venture. H14 reports “how many hours in total [the individual] has devoted to the 
new business”. Close examination of this variable reveals that some individuals have 
reported up to 60000 hours. Perhaps, owners tend to overestimate their effort, 
because this value is absurd: if one would assume even twelve working hours a day 
seven days a week, this would still mean over 13 years of permanent work without 
one single day off. See a histogram of the variable: 
55 
 
 
Illustration 11: Total Hours Devoted to New Business (Histogram) 
Since there are only very little extreme values, it is reasonable to cut the distribution 
at 10000 and create a category that catches all values above (10000 and higher). This 
will limit the effect of these extreme outliers. If many working hours limit the chance 
of exit, the relationship will still be observable. 
 
3.5.2. LOGISTIC REGRESSION 
 
Again, all variables are standardized for the sake of a more general interpretation of 
the coefficients. A logistic regression is conducted with exit as a dependent dummy 
variable and all others as independents. Observations are not any more teams but 
individuals. The sample is limited to owners whose whereabouts are traceable6 and 
to owners other than number 1 (the interviewee). This is necessary since data about 
the interviewee’s relationship to him- or herself is neither sensible nor available. Also, 
                                                                    
6 See Appendix 6 for a logistic regression where members, who are not explicitly reported as leaving, 
are assumed to stay 
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there is never an exit of owner 1 reported (which lets assume that samples in the 
PSEDII were dropped if the interviewee was not available in later waves). Keeping 
owner 1 in the sample would distort the result towards fewer exits. 
Independent variables (for correlation tables, see Appendix 4): 
 zage: centered age of the owner 
 zagedist: centered average difference to other owner’s ages 
 zEdudiff, zWEdiff, zEEdiff: centered standard deviations of the Sub-indices in 
wave A 
 zYK: centered number of years the founder knows the owner 
 male: dummy variable for gender 
 partner, relative, friend, stranger: dummy variables that indicate the personal 
relationship to owner 1 
 zhoursComm: centered total hours the owner has devoted to the business 
 
 
The most noticeable abnormality is that the variable stranger is omitted. Indeed, this 
is no error. It results from the fact that the relationship status is already defined only 
by the first three dummy variables: if a person is not a partner, relative of friend, he 
                                                                              
       _cons     .5401817   .6937584     0.78   0.436    -.8195597    1.899923
  zhoursComm    -.8937862   .3756448    -2.38   0.017    -1.630036   -.1575359
    stranger    (omitted)
      friend    -.2031426   .6458448    -0.31   0.753    -1.468975     1.06269
    relative    -.6611385    .871244    -0.76   0.448    -2.368745    1.046468
     partner    -1.632062   .7817943    -2.09   0.037    -3.164351   -.0997734
        male    -.3891864    .404438    -0.96   0.336     -1.18187    .4034974
         zYK    -.0341229   .2536211    -0.13   0.893    -.5312112    .4629653
     cEEdiff      .031194   .1479201     0.21   0.833    -.2587241     .321112
     cWEdiff    -.1560642    .295992    -0.53   0.598    -.7361979    .4240696
    cEdudiff     .0679976   .1571079     0.43   0.665    -.2399283    .3759235
    zagediff     .3098428   .2957745     1.05   0.295    -.2698645    .8895501
        zage     .1658894   .2314769     0.72   0.474     -.287797    .6195759
                                                                              
       leave        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -104.09664                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1075
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0088
                                                  LR chi2(11)     =      25.09
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        169
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must be a stranger. In this case, stranger always equals one and the regression model 
cannot be enhanced with this information. It is even impossible to calculate 
coefficients for this variable (Kohler & Kreuter, 2009). 
The first few independent variables do not have significant influence in this model. 
Men seem to exit less often because of the negative coefficient, but not on a significant 
level. The first significant variable is partner with a p-value of 0.037. As hypothesized, 
closer relationships tend to have negative influence on exits – this is observable but 
not striking throughout all dummy variables. If the same logistic regression is run 
after dropping the dummies except stranger, its coefficient is positive with 0.5121 
(not significant), which gives the idea that strangers have relatively higher odds to 
exit. See Appendix 7 for the output. 
Another significant factor is the one regarding hours devoted to the business, at least 
at a 95% confidence interval. It strongly supports the hypothesis that more dedicated 
owners are less likely to exit. 
 
3.5.3. ANALYSES USING LOWESS 
 
It is worthwhile to go one step further. Stata comes with a powerful tool for plotting 
nonlinear relationships in (also dichotomous) scatterplots: The locally weighted 
scatterplot smoother (LOWESS). For small subsections of the scatterplot, functions 
are derived. Proximity of scatter points gives them stronger weights. It trades off 
high-degree with low-degree polynomials for a balance between fit and simplicity7. 
The user can choose this “smoothing parameter”, which leads to either simpler 
                                                                    
7 http://www.itl.nist.gov/div898/handbook/pmd/section1/pmd144.htm (accessed on 25.09.2010) 
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graphs or less residuals. Especially scatterplots with one dichotomous variable can be 
advanced considerably, given there are enough data points. 
When looking at all variables, the most interesting relationship is derived from the 
variable zYK (years owner 1 knows the individual): 
 
Illustration 12: Exit-Probability (Red Line) in Relation to Acquaintance in Years (AH7) 
All observations are represented as blue points on the two horizontal lines indicating 
zero (for stay) and one (for leave). To get a slightly better image about their local 
density, they are jittered (randomly shifted on a small scale) vertically. The red line is 
the LOWESS function, and it clearly shows a U-shaped relationship. The 
interpretation is as follows: Owners who are not known for very long have a higher 
probability to leave; the probability decreases as the time of acquaintanceship 
increases, but then, approximately at a time of thirty years, increases again. To model 
this quadratic relationship, it is necessary to square the independent variable zYK and 
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include it in the regression together with the base. Then, the model looks a little 
different: 
 
The new variable, zYKs, is strongly significant. Its positive coefficient results from the 
convexity of the function. The model fit, represented by the model p-value and the 
pseudo R2 in the upper right section, is better than the fit of the previous model, 
because the p-value is smaller and the pseudo R2 is higher (Kohler & Kreuter, 2009). 
The challenging task is now to interpret the U-shaped relationship. The first half 
could be explained as follows: people who know each other only for a short while 
have incomplete information about each other. Only after a while they gain a better 
impression of their true characteristics. The chance is high that they go separate ways 
after they find out that they cannot work together as frictionless as it seemed when 
they met. But why do long acquaintances also imply higher probability of exit? The 
first idea that comes to mind brings age into play. If people know each other very 
long, they are probably older, but the correlation between the two variables only 
equals 0.46. Since age was not identified as a significant factor for exit, it is again 
reasonable to look for a nonlinear relationship with LOWESS. 
                                                                              
       _cons    -.6610205   .7929312    -0.83   0.404    -2.215137    .8930961
  zhoursComm    -1.003535   .4144404    -2.42   0.015    -1.815823   -.1912467
    stranger    (omitted)
      friend     .3149769   .6807135     0.46   0.644    -1.019197    1.649151
    relative    -.0804042   .9182149    -0.09   0.930    -1.880072    1.719264
     partner    -.6701018   .8374221    -0.80   0.424    -2.311419    .9712153
        male    -.5371392   .4309148    -1.25   0.213    -1.381717    .3074384
        zYKs     .6885826   .2225703     3.09   0.002     .2523528    1.124812
         zYK    -.6687415   .3223628    -2.07   0.038    -1.300561   -.0369221
     cEEdiff     .0592988   .1514417     0.39   0.695    -.2375215    .3561191
     cWEdiff     .0626226   .3140043     0.20   0.842    -.5528146    .6780598
    cEdudiff     .1113296   .1654087     0.67   0.501    -.2128655    .4355246
    zagediff     .1135734   .3085707     0.37   0.713     -.491214    .7183608
        zage     .1022778   .2364994     0.43   0.665    -.3612525    .5658081
                                                                              
       leave        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -97.975079                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1600
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0002
                                                  LR chi2(12)     =      37.33
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        169
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Illustration 13: Exit-Probability (Red Line) in Relation to Age (AH2) 
The relationship is clearly not linear. It also seems to have a U-shaped relationship, 
but it may be driven by a few outliers on the right where the sample density is not 
very high. It does not surprise that all owners older than 75 years exit during the 4 
years of the observed period. If the squared variable is added as zages in the 
regression, the following output results: 
                                                                               
       _cons    -.7279546   .7962681    -0.91   0.361    -2.288611    .8327021
  zhoursComm    -1.026829   .4134629    -2.48   0.013    -1.837202   -.2164568
    stranger    (omitted)
      friend      .263543   .6822487     0.39   0.699     -1.07364    1.600726
    relative    -.2515843   .9333635    -0.27   0.788    -2.080943    1.577775
     partner    -.6654086    .837648    -0.79   0.427    -2.307168    .9763512
        male    -.5458194   .4323697    -1.26   0.207    -1.393248    .3016096
        zYKs     .6885682   .2266314     3.04   0.002     .2443789    1.132758
         zYK     -.611351   .3275334    -1.87   0.062    -1.253305    .0306026
     cEEdiff     .0587686   .1512429     0.39   0.698     -.237662    .3551993
     cWEdiff     .0763384   .3164437     0.24   0.809    -.5438798    .6965567
    cEdudiff     .1290005   .1669956     0.77   0.440    -.1983049    .4563058
    zagediff     .1044157   .3147763     0.33   0.740    -.5125344    .7213659
       zages     .1382422   .1456928     0.95   0.343    -.1473104    .4237948
        zage     .0664083   .2425066     0.27   0.784    -.4088959    .5417125
                                                                              
       leave        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -97.507835                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1640
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0003
                                                  LR chi2(13)     =      38.27
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        169
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The variable shows that the relationship is not significant. Moreover, the variables 
measuring acquaintance are still at a high level of significance. The indicators for 
model fit show an ambiguous picture: compared to the previous model the p-value 
declined while pseudo R2 increased on a small scale. The graph suggested that older 
owners, as well as very young ones, have a higher probability to quit. But there might 
be other factors distorting this relationship.  
But first, both age and the variable indicating years of acquaintance have a similar U-
shaped relationship. To find out if the age explains the U-shaped relationship, it is 
necessary to relate observations to both variables. A special scatterplot might give an 
idea. Age is represented on the horizontal and acquaintance on the vertical axis. Now, 
owners that exit are plotted as hollow circles, and owners that stay as red triangles. 
 
Illustration 14: Acquaintance (vertical) vs Age (horizontal) - Scatterplot 
The sharp line from the lower left side to the high middle results from the restriction 
that an acquaintance cannot last longer than the person’s age. Owners at this line 
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reported to know each other their whole lifetime and most of them stay in the team 
(since most symbols on the line are red triangles). The exceptions are at the very top. 
These people know each other very long, but are about 60 years old and leave. Also, 
the center of the triangles is shifted more to the left, and there are some circles on the 
upper right area. This shows that as expected some older owners leave in spite of 
knowing each other for a long time, probably because of age. The concentration of 
blue circles at the lower part of the graph is also noteworthy. These are the samples 
that account for the observed higher exit probability of people that do not know each 
other for long. 
This explanation of the U-shaped relationship of acquaintance and exit results only 
from a visual analysis and it might easily be objected. There might be a very different 
logic behind the effect. 
Rational nascent entrepreneurs seek to co-operate with the best available team 
members. They source among their whole social network, which consists of different 
levels of acquaintance. Some potential candidates are known for a very short time, 
others, like relatives, are known for a whole lifetime.  
Both individuals have incomplete information about each other at the time when they 
first meet. Before, it was argued that they only later gain a better understanding 
about each other’s character, which causes an increased likelihood to separate 
because of social frictions. This argumentation is also sensible if character is replaced 
with anticipated skills and abilities. When two potential partners meet first, they both 
only obtain information about each other’s formal education and years of work 
experience. Because these formal variables are only proxies to business-relevant 
skills, they can only guess the exact skill level. Also having worked together in a non-
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entrepreneurial framework may not serve as a reliable signal. Revealing more precise 
information is a time-consuming process and only actual co-operation might be a 
proper way of achieving it. It is likely that one of the two parties over-estimated the 
other’s attributes. If disappointment crosses a certain limit of tolerance, the higher-
skilled entrepreneur may decide to break the collaboration. Either he leaves due to 
more profitable outside opportunities, or he is in the position to expel the other 
entrepreneur. 
The longer friendships and relationships have lasted before, the more complete is 
both individuals’ information in advance of the decision to collaborate. They know 
what they are getting with their partner, therefore are less likely to separate because 
of disappointment. The argumentation until here can explain the initial negative slope 
of the H7 LOWESS graph. 
After knowing each other for quite a long time, a “trust bonus” develops together with 
the affirmation of social ties. The trust bonus compensates for lack of Human Capital 
in the initial founding phase: teams with spouses or close relatives involved are often 
characterized by a higher deviation of abilities (Sonderegger, 2009). But there is no 
hint that these ventures are equally persistent as Human Capital homogenous non-
family ventures that had no trust-bonus involved. Instead, a similar logic of 
disappointment may apply: after a while of collaboration, the higher-skilled 
entrepreneur may find that the trust-bonus had let him over-estimate his or her 
partner’s skills at the beginning. He may conclude that he has better chances without 
his partner/friend. Also the trade-off between the feeling of social duties (not to 
break the collaboration) and individual profit maximization (break the collaboration) 
can cross the critical level of tolerance, and lead to a breakup of the team. This could 
be a mechanism that explains the second, upwards-sloping part of the LOWESS graph. 
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4. CONCLUSION 
 
This work gives insights into systematics that lead to entries and exits of owner-
members in teams of nascent entrepreneurs. 
The principle of Human Capital homogeneity, which guides the team formation 
process, was not discovered in the following periods. First, every team change in the 
PSEDII was identified. Team-specific standard deviations of three Human Capital 
indices, respectively one for education, work experience and entrepreneurial 
experience, were calculated before and after every change. Homogeneity slightly 
increased, but far from a significant level. 
Team size, however, was found to be a factor driving exits. This may be due to the 
simple reason that with each additional person, individual risks to leave the venture 
sum up at the team level. A factor driving entry was identified to be the heterogeneity 
of the education index. The possible explanation that educationally diverse teams will 
later need to fill gaps lacks further confirmation. A hint might be that such teams 
seem to involve close social ties more often. 
Finally, the dataset was rearranged to find factors (for exits only) on the individual 
level. The closeness of the social relationship prevents exit. Owners that devote much 
time to the new business are also likely to stay there. The most interesting 
relationship was discovered with the variable that indicates how many years the 
members have known each other. It was U-shaped: both shortest and longest 
acquaintances were associated with higher probability of exit. The downward slope 
for short acquaintances was suggested to result of initial information asymmetries 
regarding true characteristics. This concerns social and operational competence. Even 
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a high formal Human Capital (degree accomplished, years of branch experience, 
businesses owned) can mean that true competences are less than expected. Longer 
relationships diminish this asymmetry in advance and collaborations are therefore 
more stable. The upward slope, starting at approximately 30 years, must have 
another background. The idea that the age and retirement were the ultimate cause for 
the tendency could not be confirmed. Alternatively, a considerable fraction of the 
exits of members known for a long time may be explained by an overrated trust-
bonus: after having known each other for many years, individuals trust each other 
and decide to form a venture. Only on the job it is revealed that skills necessary for 
entrepreneurial success are lacking, and collaboration quits. 
The suggested explanations offered here are subject to some restrictions. First, the 
sample size had to be reduced considerably. Only team foundations with complete 
data could be used. More than half of the observations in the PSEDII are single 
ventures, and only 125 samples fulfilled the requirements to be included in the 
second part of the analyses. Only 44 teams experienced a fully traceable change, 
allowing standard deviations for the first analysis to be determined. Second, the 
PSEDII design had a major disadvantage regarding personal relationships: Length and 
type of social ties are reported just from the view of the interviewee. 
It seems that social ties dominate the observed team changes. Further research might 
help to track down the U-shaped relationship of acquaintance and exit probability. 
More datasets, for example the PSEDI, can be checked for similar results. The exact 
influence of age on exits should be determined. Also, individual characteristics of 
entering members may be worthwhile an investigation. There are many facts left to 
be discovered in the field of entrepreneurial team formation.  
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Industry averages of owner demographics used for Index calculations: 
 
Industry Years Edu YWEI YPWE YMSAR NSU NB 
Agriculture 14.1 11.5 21.6 13.7 0.8 0.4 
Communication 15.6 10.2 24.0 12.5 0.9 0.4 
Construction 13.7 10.3 17.4 9.7 0.7 0.4 
Customer-. Consumer- & 
Business Consulting Or 
Service 
14.5 8.1 19.9 9.7 1.0 0.3 
Financial & Insurance 
Activities 
14.9 8.6 18.4 10.2 0.7 0.4 
Health. Education or Social 
Services 
15.1 8.9 20.5 11.6 1.0 0.5 
Manufacturing. Mining & 
Utilities 
14.5 10.6 25.6 13.7 1.2 0.5 
Real Estate 15.1 8.2 20.2 12.7 1.2 0.5 
Retail. Restaurant. Wholesale 
Distribution & Transportation 
14.0 6.8 20.0 9.3 1.0 0.4 
     
  
Global Years Edu YWEI YPWE YMSAR NSU NB 
All Industries 14.4 8.4 20.3 10.4 1.0 0.4 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
Transformation of “Highest Level of Education” to “Years of Education” 
Diagram of the US education system: 
 
Original image: Institute of Education Sciences (IES) within the U.S. Department of Education 
Vectorized version: James Hare, Wikimedia Commons 
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/81/Education_in_the_United_States.svg (accessed on 
25.09.2010) 
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PSEDII, Question AH6_1 
 
What is the highest level of education (you have/[NAME] has) completed – (up to the eighth grade, 
some high school, high school degree, technical or vocational degree, some college, community college 
degree, a bachelor’s degree, some graduate training, a master’s degree, or a law degree, medical 
degree, or Doctorate?) 
 
 
Highest Level of Education 
(Answer in PSEDII) 
Years of Education 
(Transformation) 
01. Up to eighth grade 8 
02. Some high school 10 
03. High school degree 12 
04. Technical or vocational degree 14 
05. Some college 14 
06. Community college degree 14 
07. Bachelor’s degree 16 
08. Some graduate training 17 
09. Master’s degree 17,5 
10. Law, MD, PHD, EDD, degree 19 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
Here, an earlier approach to analyze the development of Human Capital 
homogeneity after team changes is presented. 
 
The index hcii is constructed according to Sonderegger (2009). The primary 
difference is that it combines all three sub-indices (Education, Work Experience and 
Entrepreneurial Experience) to one main index (hcii). Also, instead of using z-
transformation, each variable is projected on its minimum-maximum range. The 
results of the fractions are scores strictly between zero and one (Zero, when the 
actual value equals the minimum; one, when it equals the maximum). The min and 
max values again refer to the specific industry.  
The weights α, β and γ as well as the weights of the sub-indices β1, β2, β3, γ1 and γ2 
are also obtained specifically for each industry via principal-component analysis 
(see Sonderegger, 2009). Now, only one index value is calculated for each individual. 
 
 
Then, standard deviation within team j in wave w is calculated with 
 
where njw is the number of members of team j in wave w. 
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The difference  between two waves is now obtained via . Note the 
difference to the method used in the main part: Again, positive and negative values 
result for differences in standard deviation. Here however, negative values appear 
when , meaning an increase in homogeneity, and vice versa.  
In order to increase the sample size, two additional datasets are constructed that 
treat occurring errors differently. 
 D1 – Samples with error 1 and 2 are dropped. 38 observations remain. 
 D2 – It is assumed that missing data of an entire wave implicates no change. 
Because the assumption seems justified, the same set with 44 observations is 
used for the analysis in the main part.  
 D3 – Includes samples with team changes, but error 2 occurring. Industry 
averages are used if demographics data is not reported. According values are 
found in Appendix 1. For example, if the variable “Number of businesses owned” 
is missing for an individual of the Agricultural branch, it is set to 0.8. It is 
debatable if this method is justified. The sample size for D3 is 56. 
Using SPSS, a one sample t-test for the value of zero is conducted for D1, D2 and D3. 
Note that the datasets do not refer to the three sub-indices, but to different handling 
of errors. Similar to the approach in section 3.3.3., the null hypothesis H0 states that 
the mean of the differences is equal to zero (i.e. no significant change happens, in 
either direction).  
Although the mean of the differences in the hcii is again slightly positive, which 
would support the hypothesis, evidence for a significant tendency cannot be found. 
24 out of the 38 values in D1 are positive. 
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SPSS output for D1: 
One-Sample Statistics 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
differencesD1 38 ,0062939687 ,03925789738 ,00636847190 
 
One-Sample Test 
 Test Value = 0                                        
 
t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) Mean Difference 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
 Lower Upper 
differencesD1 ,988 37 ,329 ,00629396874 -,0066097810 ,0191977185 
 
 
SPSS output for D2: 
 
One-Sample Statistics 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
differencesD2 44 ,0028779817 ,03793326531 ,00571865491 
 
One-Sample Test 
 Test Value = 0                                        
 
t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) Mean Difference 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
 Lower Upper 
differencesD2 ,503 43 ,617 ,00287798168 -,0086547851 ,0144107484 
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SPSS output for D3: 
 
One-Sample Statistics 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
differencesD3 56 ,0013695873 ,03696567993 ,00493974676 
 
 
One-Sample Test 
 Test Value = 0                                        
 
t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) Mean Difference 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
 Lower Upper 
differencesD3 ,277 55 ,783 ,00136958732 -,0085298864 ,0112690611 
 
 
It is notable that D1 has the highest mean and its confidence interval is located 
further to the right than those of D2 and D3. Therefore, D2 and D3 show even worse 
support for the hypothesis of increasing homogeneity. 
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APPENDIX 4 
 
Correlation Tables: 
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APPENDIX 5 
 
Samples with standard deviation (Std_Edu_1) of the education index are sorted in 
ascending order. In the first 5 lines with low standard deviation, there is only one 
team where a partnership is involved. In the last samples, 4 out of 5 involve a 
partnership. This suggests that the formation of educationally diverse teams is eased 
by social ties and a trust-bonus, which serves as a substitute to Human Capital. 
 
 
. 
                                                                        
562.    50997   1.7548391          1           0         0           0  
552.    51533   1.2665858          1           1         0           0  
551.    50861   1.2375625          1           0         0           0  
536.    50004   1.0863147          0           1         0           1  
532.    51019   .96283688          1           0         0           0  
                                                                        
527.    50245   .95491424          1           1         0           0  
508.    51430    .9359142          1           0         0           0  
492.    51694   .88952372          1           0         0           0  
489.    51377   .88952372          0           1         0           0  
473.    50891   .81892493          0           0         1           0  
                                                                        
430.    51601   .58309977          0           0         0           1  
423.    51784   .48141844          0           1         0           0  
416.    50640   .46882986          1           0         1           0  
406.    50900   .46882986          1           0         0           0  
368.    51245   .46882986          0           0         1           0  
                                                                        
361.    51434   .46882986          0           0         1           0  
304.    51447   .44476186          0           0         1           0  
302.    51478   .44476186          1           0         0           0  
294.    50163   .44201703          1           0         0           1  
291.    50076   .44119419          0           0         1           0  
                                                                        
270.    50509   .40601856          0           0         1           0  
226.    51788   .33089564          0           1         1           0  
217.    50398   .28709848          1           0         0           1  
173.    51448           0          0           0         1           0  
161.    51022           0          0           0         1           0  
                                                                        
149.    51160           0          0           0         1           0  
113.    51247           0          0           1         0           0  
 79.    50771           0          0           1         0           0  
 52.    51407           0          1           0         0           0  
 12.    50209           0          0           0         1           0  
                                                                        
       SAMPID   Std_Edu_1   partners   relatives   friends   strangers  
                                                                        
. list  SAMPID Std_Edu_1 partners relatives friends strangers if entry, abbreviate(10)
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APPENDIX 6 
 
Logistic regression output if owners, whose status (stay/leave) is not reported after 
entry, are assumed to stay. Note that there are now 620 instead of 169 observations. 
Social ties (especially partnership) and hours committed stay significant; the U-
shaped relationship of zAH7 is not any more traceable. Note zAH7 and zAH7s are 
renamed to zYK and zYKs in the main part. 
 
                                                                               
       _cons    -1.027645   .5515974    -1.86   0.062    -2.108756    .0534665
  zhoursComm    -.8226238   .3379247    -2.43   0.015    -1.484944   -.1603036
    stranger    (omitted)
      friend    -.5588315   .5130071    -1.09   0.276    -1.564307     .446644
    relative     -1.22246   .6585867    -1.86   0.063    -2.513266    .0683465
     partner    -2.767174   .6351293    -4.36   0.000    -4.012005   -1.522343
      EEdist    -.1179083   .1217687    -0.97   0.333    -.3565706     .120754
      WEdist    -.0314306   .2348649    -0.13   0.894    -.4917574    .4288961
    zedudist     .0908199   .1424117     0.64   0.524    -.1883019    .3699417
       zAH7s     .1505048    .113985     1.32   0.187    -.0729018    .3739114
        zAH7    -.0707934   .2170412    -0.33   0.744    -.4961863    .3545995
    zagedist     .0402248   .2229474     0.18   0.857    -.3967441    .4771937
        zage     .2772022   .1769764     1.57   0.117    -.0696652    .6240696
                                                                              
  assumestay        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -200.03871                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1472
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  LR chi2(11)     =      69.06
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        620
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APPENDIX 7 
 
Logistic regression output if all dummy variables indicating social relationship are 
dropped except stranger 
 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons    -.3651333   .3244337    -1.13   0.260    -1.001012     .270745
  zhoursComm    -.9814969   .3843396    -2.55   0.011    -1.734789   -.2282051
    stranger     .5121821   .6365811     0.80   0.421    -.7354938    1.759858
        male    -.0102663   .3658753    -0.03   0.978    -.7273688    .7068361
         zYK    -.1620992    .174288    -0.93   0.352    -.5036973    .1794989
     cEEdiff      .005248   .1411981     0.04   0.970    -.2714951    .2819912
     cWEdiff    -.0774357   .2803694    -0.28   0.782    -.6269496    .4720783
    cEdudiff     .0853381   .1512898     0.56   0.573    -.2111846    .3818607
    zagediff     .2513418   .2860701     0.88   0.380    -.3093454    .8120289
        zage     .1621045   .2195576     0.74   0.460    -.2682206    .5924295
                                                                              
       leave        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -107.99506                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0741
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0443
                                                  LR chi2(9)      =      17.29
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        169
 
ABSTRACT ENGLISH 
 
The reasons for young ventures to exchange owner-members may be various. It is the 
aim of this work to find common underlying drivers for exits and entries of members. 
Focus is put on personal characteristics such as Human Capital. As regards initial 
team formation, empirical evidence suggests that members with relatively similar 
Human Capital levels join forces. The obvious assumption is that also in the following 
periods this principle will guide member change, further increasing Human Capital 
homogeneity over time. An empirical analysis of the PSEDII, a database that monitors 
the evolution of 1214 young ventures, does not support this hypothesis. Other factors 
seem to be more relevant, the most striking being a U-shaped relationship between 
member’s exit probability and the time they have known each other. Among 
entrepreneurial teams, both the shortest and longest acquaintances seem to be cut 
more often. The reason may be distorted perception of other’s true characteristics: 
Lack of information in short acquaintances and a socially motivated overestimation of 
skills in long ones. 
  
ABSTRACT GERMAN 
 
Unternehmen, die in der Vorgründungsphase Teammitglieder austauschen, mögen 
unterschiedliche Gründe dafür haben. Das Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es, zugrunde liegende, 
allgemeine Treiber für den Ausstieg und die Aufnahme von Mitgliedern zu finden. 
Insbesondere werden persönliche Charakteristika wie das Humankapital untersucht. 
Es gibt empirische Beweise dafür, dass Personen, die gemeinsam gründen, relativ 
ähnliche Humankapital-Levels aufweisen. Die naheliegende Vermutung ist, dass 
dasselbe Prinzip auch in der darauf folgenden Zeit für Teamänderungen gilt, was eine 
weitere Steigerung der Humankapital-Homogenität zur Folge hätte. Die empirische 
Analyse des PSEDII, einer Datenbank, die die Entwicklung 1214 junger Unternehmen 
verfolgt, unterstützt diese Hypothese nicht. Andere Faktoren scheinen relevanter zu 
sein, besonders sticht das U-förmige Verhältnis zwischen 
Ausstiegswahrsscheinlichkeit und der Zeit, wie lange die Mitglieder sich kennen, 
hervor. Die kürzesten und die längsten Bekanntschaften scheinen sich unter den 
Teams in der Vorgründungsphase am öftesten zu trennen. Die Ursache dafür kann 
eine Fehleinschätzung der wahren Eigenschaften des Anderen sein: Unvollständige 
Information bei kurzer und ein sozial begründetes Überschätzen der Fähigheiten bei 
langer Bekanntschaft. 
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